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RECENT CASES

deprivation. Therefore the loss should be placed on the manufacturer, who is best able to minimize it.l6
If this smacks of strict liability, the answer may be that this
is what is needed. Let the only basis for non-recovery be remoteness
of causation.27 In placing the manufacturer in this position, it is
probably only fair to allow him reasonable defenses, i.e. contributory
negligence, unforeseeability, etc. The ultimate answer may be to
abrogate the cause of action for breach of implied warranty and
substitute a new cause of action which sounds in tort, but which
does not put the plaintiff to proof of the manufacturer's negligence.
JOHN GRAHAM

ATTORNEY

AND

FIFTH AMENDMENT

CLIENT

-

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW -

RIGHT TO JUST COMPENSATION

ATTORNEY'S

FOR DEFENDING

INDIGENT CLIENT-The Petitioner was appointed by the federal court
to defend an indigent client which involved 108 hours of labor,

use of his firm's facilities and out of pocket expenses. He requested
compensation under the fifth amendment guarantee of just compensation for property taken by the government. The United States
District Court for the District of Oregon held that the petitioner was
entitled to just compensation because his property was taken without due process of law. The court also found that by taking his
services, the government had entered into an implied contract that
it would pay for this property. The United States Court of Appeals
reversed the district court decision, holding that upon becoming a
member of the bar the petitioner was entitled to no compensation
because as an officer of the court he has assented to donating his
services. Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964);
United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).
Receiving some compensation for defending an indigent client

is not the problem since the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 now reimburses an attorney for defending such client in a federal court.,
The Federal District of North Dakota has adopted a plan under
this act in which a competent attorney is appointed, with option
16. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. App. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
"Those who suffer Injury from defective products are unprepared to meet Its consequences. . . . [T]he risk of Injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed
among the public as a

cost of doing business."

17. In Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 126 N.W.2d 350 (Iowa 1964), the court states that
the plaintiff's failure to establish causation is part of the reason for refusing to allow
recovery In implied warranty.
1.

CRIMINAL JUSTIcE ACT or 1964, 78 Stat. 552 (1964),

18 U.S.C. § 300,6A

(1964).

An

attorney appointed pursuant to this section, or a bar association or legal aid agency which
made an attorney available for appointment, shall, at the conclusion of the representation
or any segment thereof, be compensated at a rate not exceeding $15 per hour for time
expended in court or before a United States commissioner, and $10 per hour for time
reasonably expended out of Court, and shall be reimbursed for expenses reasonably incurred.
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to decline, and at the conclusion of the case he may submit a
claim for compensation which is paid at the discretion of the judge. 2
The purpose of the fifth amendment guarantee is to bar the
government from placing a public burden on a particular class of
people when the public should bear it as a whole. 3 This Constitutional provision pertains to every sort of interest a citizen may
possess,4 and how it is taken is immaterial. 5 Thus, regardless of
the business, occupation, or calling a person has engaged in, it
constitutes property within the meaning of due process of law 6
for which just compensation must be granted.7 What is meant by
just compensation is that the full and perfect equivalent in money
must be paid for the property taken.8 Thus, the appointment of
an attorney to defend an indigent constitutes a taking of his business
and should entitle him to just compensation under the fifth amendment.
Despite the fifth amendment argument for just compensation
the legal profession seems to be plagued by along tradition of holding an attorney to be an officer of the court. One of the burdens
placed upon him as such officer is to gratuitously render services
to an indigent at the suggestion of the court9 since humanity
demands these services for the poor and defenseless. 10 The law
confers rights and privileges upon the attorney which are to be
reciprocally enjoyed with his duties and obligations. But by becoming an officer of the court he has impliedly consented to the
giving of his services which can no longer be taken."
It appears as though it may not be long before an attorney
will receive the just compensation he so rightfully deserves. The
startling decision in the present case, some dicta,'12 and the leniency
shown by the courts toward disbarment, 8 may indicate that a
2.

As advised by the Clerk of the United States District Court, District of North

Dakota, THE PROPOSED PLAN FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF DEFENDANTS FINANCIALLY UNABLE TO OBTAIN AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE UNDER THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1964 has

been adopted and went into effect on August 20, 1965. Under this plan, competent attorneys are placed on a panel from which the judge will select counsel when an indigent
client appears. The attorney need not accept the appointment, but if he does he must
continue on such case until relieved by the court of appeals. At the conclusion of the
case the attorney may submit a claim for compensation and for reimbursement of his
expenses. Nominal expenses not exceeding $50 may be received without prior authorization
of the court The court must approve anything in excess of $50. An affidavit must be
filed showing time expended, services rendered, expenses incurred, and compensation received from any other source. At the judge's discretion compensation will be given, but
It will not necessarily be just compensation.
3. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); Dillon v. United States, 230 F.
Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964).
4. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
5. United States v. Finn, 127 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Okla. 1954).
6. Lewis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928); State ex rel Sampson v.
Sheridan, 25 Wyo. 347, 170 Pac. 1 (1918).
7. Supra note 4.
8. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
9. Wayne County v. Waller, 90 Pa. 99 (1879).
10. Arkansas County v. Freeman & Johnson, 31 Ark. 266 (1876).
11. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).
12. Webb V. Baird, 6 Porter 13 (Ind. 1854). "The idea of one calling enjoying peculiar
privileges, and therefore being more honorable than any other, is not. congenial to our
institutions. And that any class should be paid for their particular services in empty
honors is an obsolete idea, belonging to another age and to a state of society hostile to
liberty and equal rights."
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move is being made to solve the problem. It is difficult to determine
the effect that just compensation would have on the principles surrounding the legal profession and the pride developed by the individual lawyer. It does not seem possible, however, that it would
have an adverse effect on principles and pride if nominal compensation did not. It would seem that the attorney would work harder
to build up individual pride if he would not have to worry about
adequate compensation. It may even strengthen his principles in
that he would not attempt to get out of an appointment or advise
a client in such a way so as to end the trial quickly.
The very fact that state statutes and the Criminal Justice Act
of 1964 provide for compensation indicates that it is necessary. The
judge in the present case admitted that he selected an attorney
and firm which had the means to stand the burden. This being
the case, the writer can conceive of no reason why it should not
be just compensation rather than a nominal sum.
RONALD SCHWARTZ

BASTARD-DUTY

TO

SUPPORT-EFFECTIVENESS OF

UNIFORM

RE-

AcT-Plaintiff obtained a judgement in Kentucky under which defendant was adjudged the father
of plaintiff's illegitimate child and ordered to contribute to the child's
support. Plaintiff then brought an action in Texas under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act to secure enforcement
of the Kentucky judgment. In refusing to enforce the judgement,
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, with one justice dissenting,' held
that section 7 of the Uniform Support Act,2 granting to plaintiff the
election of state law to be applied, was repugnant to the fourteenth
amendment of the U. S. Constitution and that article five of the
U. S. Constitution was inapplicable because of the ambulatory nature of the Kentucky judgment. Biorgos v. Bjorgos, 391 S.W.2d
528 (Tex. 1965).
Although a majority3 of jurisdictions concur with the Texas
court regarding the obligations under the full faith and credit clause,
the trend is toward upholding ambulatory judgments of sister
CIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT

13. Posey & Tompkins v. Mobile County, 50 Ala. 6 (1873). "If counsel wilfully refuse
to discharge this duty, on a proper order of the court, they should be removed or suspended." The plan adopted by the United States District Court, District of North Dakota,
supra note 2, states that: "The adoption of this plan shall not affect the obligation of
attorneys admitted to the Bar of this Court to accept appointment to serve as counsel
without compensation for indigent defendants in criminal cases, in habeas corpus actions,
and in proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 2255."
1. The dissent favored enforcement, basing his decision on the Texas Supreme Court's
application of full faith and credit in Guercia v. Guercia, 150 Tex. 418, 241 S.W.2d 297
(1951).
2. TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. art. 2328b-3 § 7 (1964).
3. E.g., Ogden v. Ogden, 33 So. 2d 870, (Fla. 1947); Newell v. Newell, 77 Idaho 355,
293 P.2d 663 (1956); Latham v. Latham, 223 Miss. 263, 78 So. 2d 147 (1955).

